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September 30, 2016

Hon. Saliann Scarpulla Supreme Court of the State of New York New York County Commercial Division 60 Centre Street New York, NY 10007

VIA NYSECF

Re: In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 150973/2016: Article 77 Transcript Citations

Dear Justice Scarpulla:

Pursuant to the Court's request at oral argument for "trial testimony during the first Article 77 proceeding that . . . shed[s] light on what the parties intended the settlement agreement to mean and how it should function," Respondents Tilden Park Capital Management LP and Prosiris Capital Management LP respectfully submit the following transcript excerpts from the prior Article 77 proceeding concerning these trusts, *In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon*, No. 651786/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).¹

In that proceeding, the Trustee argued for judicial approval of a settlement that reached a fair result for investors – not just a small group of investors. The negotiations that led to the settlement involved give and take with no class of investors getting all that they wanted. The clear primary intent, however, was to pay funds to the "tranches who are most senior *who suffered losses*" – not simply to the senior-most tranches. Tr. 1877:16-1878:16 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 10). And they intended that the Settlement proceeds be distributed through the various waterfalls in the PSAs of the 530 trusts. Tr. 1642:6-1643:2 (Jason Kravitt) & Petitioner's Ex. 44 (Ex. 1).

¹ Emphases are added throughout and indicated in bold italic text.

1. The parties intended to pay the Settlement through each individual PSA's "waterfall" provisions:²

Tr. 1642:6-1643:2 (Jason Kravitt, Mayer Brown partner and lead negotiator for BONY) & Petitioner's Ex. 44 (Ex. 1):

Q: The next paragraph, Ted, I assume that's Mr. Mirvis [attorney for Bank of America], correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Ted asked us how we felt about various alternative means of payment to certificate holders on some paren but not nearly enough yet reflection, *we think that the, "default" remedy is for funds to go through the waterfall if at all possible*. Then skip the paren. We are completely open minded at this point. So, talking about the funds going through the waterfall, you were already discussing, after the very first meeting, how the funds were going to be distributed to the trusts, correct?

- A: Correct.
- Q: And one possibility was through the waterfall?
- A: Correct.

Q: And at that – you understand or believe that the process for putting funds through the trust was ultimately not agreed to be a waterfall?

A: No, what was agreed was that the cash payments to each trust would go through the waterfall.

2. The parties intended to pay through the PSAs' waterfalls to avoid potential conflicts among competing certificate holders:

Tr. 4589:19-4590:5 (Loretta Lundberg, managing director of BONY's Corporate Trust Division) (Ex. 2):

Q: Bank of New York Mellon knew that *different groups of certificate holders could be competing for the same dollars within the trusts* that Ms. Patrick had put the bank on notice of in the summer of 2010?

A: *That's true.*

² Dkt. #3 (Settlement Agreement) $\S 3(d)(i)$ (Settlement funds should be distributed "in accordance with *the distribution provisions of*" each PSA) (emphasis added); Tr. 1879:5-1879:12 (Kravitt) (the "waterfall" is "the distribution [of payments] set out within the trust documents").

Q: And Bank of New York Mellon knew that there was – *that it had the potential to create conflicts among certificate holders*; correct?

A: Well, the PSAs set forth how money is to flow to different classes of certificate holders and certificate holders should understand that when they bought the securities.

3. The parties understood that there were different PSAs, with different waterfall provisions, in the 530 trusts at issue, and intended to respect those differences:

Tr. 1479:12-1481:7 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 3):

Q: You found through that process that there were different provisions in the 530 Pooling and Servicing Agreements, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that process was undertaken in part because Bank of New York Mellon was a Trustee 530 different times, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: In 530 different trusts?

A: Correct.

Q: And the obligations of the Trustee in each one of those trusts was driven in part by whatever the language was of the respective Pooling and Servicing agreement?

A: Correct.

Q: And the rights of certificate holders in each one of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the language of that particular Pooling and Servicing Agreement?

A: *Correct*.

Q: And you found that there were differences in provisions within the 530 trusts that mattered as it related to the settlement negotiations?

• • •

A: There were - I'm trying to answer this precisely. There were differences in provisions. There's lots of wording differences in the provisions. If you're asking were there material differences - in other words, if there are differences that can make a difference in how things come out, how we went to it with an important legal issue, how

it would come out, I don't think that there were many instances of that. However, I can't say that there was no material difference between all 530 agreements.

- Q: You can't say because you don't know?
- A: Because I don't remember.
- Q: Do you remember if you did know before June 29th, 2011?

A: To the best of my knowledge, we had reviewed all 530 trust agreements as to the provisions that affected the various things that we were doing in the settlement.

Q: So is it your testimony that you, on behalf of Bank of New York Mellon and, therefore, Bank of New York Mellon knew what differences were in the 530 trusts during the settlement negotiations?

A: We believe that we did.

4. The parties intended that the Settlement would follow the PSAs "to a tee" – without any opportunity to pick and choose which of the PSAs would be followed and which would not, or which provisions of a given PSA would apply:

Tr. 2308:14-22 (Robert Bailey, in-house counsel for BONY) (Ex. 4):

Q: Was there a discussion that they were going to play by the book and follow the PSAs in the settlement discussions?

A: I don't know if it was expressed, but *I think it was understood that the process* moving forward would have to conform and comport with the PSAs.

Q: And is it your view based upon what you know about the process to move forward, that *the Trustee followed the PSAs to the tee* from that meeting on November 3, 2010 until June, 2011?

A: *I'm not aware of any material deviation from the PSAs.*

Tr. 1918:8-1919:8 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 5):

Q: Mr. Kravitt, each of the 530 Trusts has a corresponding Governing Agreement; is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And for most of the trusts, the governing – of the governing document is what we're calling the Pooling and Servicing Agreement; is that correct?

A: Correct.

. . .

Q: And the PSA set forth the duties and obligations of the parties to the PSAs; is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And that includes the trustees; is that correct?

A: Correct.

. . .

Q: And none of those parties get to just pick and choose which of the obligations in the PSAs it is going to follow; is that correct?

A: *Correct.*

Q: The parties are not allowed to say, You know what, I'll follow the other provisions, but I'm not going to follow all of these provisions, right?

A: Right.

Tr. 2157:25-2158:10 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 5):

Q: Mr. Kravitt, you testified that the power to bring claims gives the Trustee here the power to accept a remedy that is in the best interest of security holders; isn't that correct?

A: I did.

Q: And, that does not however, give the Trustee the power to rewrite the PSAs, does it?

A: It does not.

Q: And, in fact, it does not give the Trustee the right to override express provisions of the PSAs governing when they may be changed, correct?

A: *Correct*.

5. AIG specifically insisted that the individual PSAs should govern how each trust would operate with respect to the Settlement:

Tr. 268:16-269:15 (opening statement of Michael Rollin, attorney for AIG) (Ex. 5):

Now, as everybody has discussed and as Mr. Reilly noted, there are 530 trusts in this case. They are these. There is a lot of them. Each of these trusts has its own governing document, normally it's called a pooling and servicing agreement. For the indentured trusts it's called something different. And these PSAs – and nobody will dispute this, you won't hear anyone saying otherwise in evidence – the PSAs dictate how the trusts are supposed to operate. They tell the trustee what it's supposed to do. They tell the master servicer what it's supposed to do. They are not allowed to change it. They've got what it tells them they are supposed to do. And as Ms. Patrick indicated, "what happens here has to be grounded in the contract." That's a quote. And nobody is going to disagree with that, your Honor. No witness is going to say otherwise. But significantly, the PSAs are not all the same. And this is nowhere more apparent than with the repurchase of modified loan provision. Some of the PSAs require the master servicer to repurchase modified loans, others do not.

Your Honor, it is not challenging to figure this out. You just have to read the PSAs. And I know there is a lot of them and it might take a while to go through all 530, but the trustee was supposed to read the PSAs. *We read the PSAs, your Honor*.

6. The Trustee, the sole signatory for the Trusts, acted for the benefit of all certificate holders in all 530 Trusts, not only the senior-most certificate holders:

Tr. 1777:12-18 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 6):

Q: You also knew that Bank of New York Mellon has a continuing fiduciary duty to the Certificate Holders, correct?

- A: A continuing fiduciary duty to be loyal to them.
- Q: And that's *all Certificate Holders in the 530 trusts?*
- A: Or any other trusts where we're Trustee.
- 7. The "institutional investors" (including Blackrock and AEGON) were involved in negotiating the settlement and supported a "universe" deal covering all 530 trusts, not just the 17 at issue now:

Tr. 1354:22-1356:13 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 7):

Q: Now, in the next paragraph you use the term "universe transaction." What is that a reference to?

A: Well, from the very first meeting, that is, the November 18th meeting, the parties discussed what the settlement could apply to. When Kathy Patrick had come into the negotiations and when we started out we were both thinking in terms – thinking in terms

of the settlement applying just to those trusts where Ms. [Kathy] Patrick's investors³ could give the trustee a binding Safe Harbor instruction. BofA announced their interest at the very start of their first meeting of having a settlement that extended to a wider group trusts because that would make it more advantageous to it if it was going to pay a large sum of money and reformulate the way it serviced assets, the more trusts involved the better so that it could put all its legacy and RMBS problems behind it. From the trustee's points of view, we thought that if it could be done to negotiate a settlement that applied to a much wider platform, that would be good for all investors, because that would include investors who otherwise would have no remedy if they warranted the trust that Kathy Patrick's group could give a binding Safe Harbor instruction to. So all the parties are interested in the idea of extending the settlement beyond the Safe Harbor trust, and that is what we mean by universe – about the universe of transactions, what could it apply to.

Q: Now, at the time that settlement discussions began, what is your recollection of how many trusts were being initially discussed?

A: I believe when I first met with Kathy in Houston we were talking about something on the order of 65 trusts.

Q: And before that number got to the 530 that are addressed in this litigation, did that number grow to some other figure?

A: Yes. Even while the trust being considered for settlement remained just the trust that Kathy could give binding instructions with regard to, other investors started to join her group. And as investors joined her group and their holdings were combined with the holdings of investors already in the group, the number of trusts as to which she could give binding instructions grew and it grew to over 100 and then I think it grew eventually to over 200.

8. Blackrock and AEGON, in addition to many other institutional investors who participated in negotiations, held various classes of certificates, not merely the senior-most certificates. Accordingly, it is not a fair conclusion that the Settlement was intended only to benefit the senior-most certificates:

Tr. 3501:11-3502:22 (Professor Daniel Fischel, expert for BONY) (Ex. 8):

Q: Professor Fischel, right before the break, you were taking us through Professor Levitin's analysis of the role of the institutional investors . . .

³ Ms. Patrick represented numerous institutional investors in negotiating the Settlement Agreement and litigating the prior Article 77 proceeding, including Blackrock, AEGON, and affiliated entities. *See* Affidavit of Kathy D. Patrick, *In re Bank of N.Y. Mellon*, No. 651786/2011, Dkt. #15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. June 29, 2011), ¶ 1.

A: Yes.... But this is supposedly the second basis in Professor Levitin's opinion as to why the institutional investors are not representative.

So if you begin just with the first sentence, "the institutional investors may not be", again, the same speculation, "invested in similarly supposed tranches of the covered trusts." And then he goes through an example of what would happen if the institutional investors had, for example, senior tranches and other certificate holders in the 530 trusts did not, rather than read the whole thing. But if you just go to the last sentence and just highlight that, "if that were the case, their interests would not be representative of many other certificate holders." So, again, he doesn't say that is the case, he just speculates as to what might happen if it were the case. But, again, it turns out that this is something that can be checked and it's not the case. You can look at the CUSIP numbers for the certificate holders of the various trusts that were provided by the institutional investors interrogatories, look at a standard database, ABS Net, and compare the tranches held by the institutional investors with all the other certificate holders in all the different trusts.

And so it's not just speculation, again, it's incorrect speculation. Speculation that can be refuted by checking, and certainly *provides no support for the basic claim that the institutional investors are not representative of the other certificate holders. If anything, if you did the checking, you would conclude the opposite.*

9. The Settlement was a compromise between "some of the most sophisticated investors in the world," and the court proceeding was a way to allow all investors to have a voice, so that all issues – including those being raised now by AIG, Blackrock and AEGON – could be considered:

Tr. 3124:7-3128:25 (Richard Stanley, head of BONY's "Structured Finance Group") (Ex. 9):

Q: Mr. Stanley, what was your rationale for voting in favor of the Trustee entering into the Settlement Agreement?

A: ... [T]his was a compromise. It was a compromise between parties that are having a real challenging time up front getting together, where I am heading there. You are dealing with 22 of some the most sophisticated investors in the world and they approved it. So, you know, in my mind, that's, it's market tested. Here is the investor telling me, I want the deal. So, I have a market test with some of the most sophisticated investors in the world. I have got more money on the table that some of obligors that I understood could even pay. I had a certainty of payment, and then you get to the point where, about the other investors that are not at the table because there are lot more investors in these Trusts than 22, whatever the number was.

That's where the Court approval was discussed and again, this is my rationale, this was a forum for other investors to have a voice. So, it opened it up to the public, if you will, all the investors, to have a voice at the table. So, I am sitting here saying okay, it's market tested by investors that have skin in the game, real skin, I know there was a challenge in

getting to that compromise, just given the length of time it's taken to get, the months it took

10. The parties intended for the Settlement to be paid to the "tranches who are most senior *who suffered losses*" – not simply to the senior-most tranches:

Tr. 1877:16-1878:16 (Jason Kravitt) (Ex. 10):

Q: Now, let's tell the Court what the effect is. For a large Institutional Investor who has bought into any of these tranches, any of the trusts that we are dealing with, at a deep discount, the amount of money they are going to get back on the proposed waterfall will be substantially greater a return than somebody who bought into the tranche and has suffered the downturn and not sold out? They are at par?

• • •

A: Well, I disagree. Here is why I disagree. The way we wrote the Settlement Agreement is that *it's the tranches who are most senior who suffered losses who get the cash first*, therefore, the people who are holding subordinated and most subordinated tranches, likely, will not get any cash out of the settlement if the losses in the settlement went to any of the senior level tranches. So, if you made a bet on a subordinated tranche, this wouldn't necessarily get you any cash distributed out of the settlement. The way the cash is distributed would restore the face amount of some of this – or the face amount or the partial portion of the face amount of any lower seniority tranche, it might get some interest in a future period it might not otherwise get. But the recovery goes first in line to the senior holders and then the next level and so on down to the bottom.

* * *

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Steven F. Molo Steven F. Molo

CC: All counsel of record via NYSECF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 5	Page 1639 J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Riley Q Did they make clear to you during the settlement process they wouldn't turn the loan files over? A They made it very clear that they would prefer not to	1 2	Page 1641 39:52-03:41:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Q When was the last time the two banks discussed the
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 5	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Riley Q Did they make clear to you during the settlement process they wouldn't turn the loan files over?	1 2	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 5	Q Did they make clear to you during the settlement process they wouldn't turn the loan files over?	2	, ,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 5	process they wouldn't turn the loan files over?		
4 5 7 8 9 10 5		3	Bank of America providing loan files?
6 7 8 9 10 s		4	A Mr. Reilly, I don't remember precisely, but it
7 8 9 10 9	turn loan files over.	5	probably would have been not later than February or March.
8 9 10 \$	Q Who said that?	6	Q You said you discussed sampling with the Bank of
9 10 9	A Who? Who from Bank of America?	7	America?
10 క	Q Correct.	8	A Yes.
	A I'm sure it was said on more than one occasion and I'm	9	Q What did you discuss about sampling? Did you have
	sure it was said by a Wachtell attorney, but I don't remember	10	specific conversations about the numbers that would be
11	the circumstances or who.	11	sampled?
12	Q When?	12	A No. Most of the dialogue I had with Bank of
13	A I'm sure the statement on fighting was Ted Mervis'.	13	America on sampling were issues that I sent to them to
14	Q Was there a point between October of 2010 and	14	consider when it came to if and when it came time to
	June 29th of 2011, that it became clear to you that Bank of	15	construct a sampling formula, just to construct the sampling
	America and Bank of New York Mellon and Ms. Patrick and its	16	formula. And we never debated how many loans need to be
	Institutional Investors were going down the route of	17	sampled or the types of criteria I suggested we think about.
	negotiating without the loan files?	18	Q Did the Trustee ever reach a final view on what an
19	A Let me try and make this clear, and I apologize if it's a long answer. Okay?	19	appropriate sample would be in the 530 trusts? A No.
20 21	Whether or not we asked for loan files, again, was a	20 21	Q Did the Trustee ever obtain any counsel regarding
	function of how well the negotiations were going with regard to	21	what an appropriate number of loan samples would be?
	he cash payment and whether we thought we needed to go look at	23	A No.
	loan files. We thought by "we," I mean the Institutional	24	Q Did the Trustee ever ask anyone to start the
	Investors and the trustee thought that those negotiations	25	process of determining how many loans would be statistically
	were going well enough, and the information that we had at the	26	significant for sampling the 530 trusts?
			5 1 5
	Page 1640		Page 1642
	8:40-03:39:33)	`	1:41:27-03:42:48)
1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Riley time was sufficient that we didn't need to hold out for	1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly A No.
	reviewing loan files. So there was never a decision made on	∠ 3	Q Did the Trustee ever determine how much it would
	any particular day, we just never reached a point where we felt	4	cost to engage in a loan sampling of 530 trusts?
	that we needed to go back and ask for loan files.	5	A No.
6	Q When was the last time that the Bank of New York	6	
7	Mellon asked for loan files from Bank of America?	7	Mr. Mirvis, correct?
8	A I don't think technically that we ever did ask for	8	A Correct.
9	loan files. We discussed if we did a sampling what the	9	Q Ted asked us how we felt about various alternative
10 :	sampling would be like, but we didn't we never made a	10	means of payment to certificate holders on some paren but
11	specific request for loan files.	11	not nearly enough yet reflection, we think that the,
12	Q There was never a point and I think we had this	12	"default" remedy is for funds to go through the waterfall if
13 (conversation, but I'm trying to make sure I understand it.	13	at all possible.
14	There was a point where loan files were no longer	14	Then skip the paren. We are completely open
	discussed between Bank of New York Mellon and Bank of America,	15	minded at this point.
	correct?	16	So, talking about the funds going through the
17	A Right. But that doesn't mean that we wouldn't by	17	waterfall, you were already discussing, after the very first
	we," I mean the Bank of New York Mellon, wouldn't have gone	18	meeting, how the funds were going to be distributed to the
	back to discussing a request for them if we felt it was	19	trusts, correct? A Correct.
	necessary to do so. (Continued on the next page.)	20	Q And one possibility was through the waterfall?
21 22	(Communed on the next page.)	21 22	A Correct.
22		22	Q And at that you understand or believe that the
23 24		23 24	process for putting funds through the trust was ultimately
24 25		25	not agreed to be a waterfall?
		26	A No, what was agreed was that the cash payments to
26			

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	Page 1643		Page 1645
	:43:02-03:44:17)	`	3:45:45-03:47:41)
1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly	1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
2	each trust would go through the waterfall.	2	as to what to tell certificate holders as to the Trustee,
3	Q Do you know, as you sit here today, how much money	3	did you?
4	would go to any particular trust?	4	A No. I didn't want Bank of America to be surprised
5	A No.	5	by anything we put in a notice to certificate holders.
6	Q Is that calculable?	6	Q Because you were already working with them in a
7	A It's not calculable in the following sense: In	7	coordinated fashion, correct?
8	order to calculate it you would have to know not only all	8	A No. Because it has been my experience that
9	the present losses that each trust has but all the future	9	negotiations often fall apart if the parties don't
10	losses they would have. As the formula that was agreed on	10	coordinate their disclosure.
11	in the settlement agreement for dividing the funds up among	11	Q At this point, though, did any process get set up
12	the trusts, there was a fraction, the numerator of which was	12	for public disclosure of the negotiations?
	the historic and predicted future losses for each trust	13	
13	•		A No. We agreed at some point that we would discuss
14	divided by a denominator, which was the sum of all those	14	
15	numerators. So until there's the last dollar loss on the	15	to discuss disclosure.
16	last trust, or until the settlement is actually agreed on	16	Q Nothing in this lawsuit discusses the possibility
17	and NERA starts it's calculation of future losses you can't	17	of litigation, correct?
18	do the calculation.	18	A Nothing I'm confused by what you're saying.
19	Now, you can do an estimate but you can't do	19	What lawsuit?
20	the actual calculation.	20	Q Nothing I'm sorry. Nothing in this e-mail
21	Q And it hasn't been done?	21	suggests the possibility of litigation, correct?
22	A I'm sorry, sir?	22	A Correct.
23	Q It has not been done?	23	Q If we could look at Exhibit R1474. This is an
24	A It has not been done.	24	e-mail you sent on November 30th, 2010, correct?
25	Q I asked you earlier before lunch whether you	25	A Correct.
26	considered this a transaction.	26	Q And you sent it to Mr. Mirvis, Mr. Koplow and Ms.
	Page 1644		Page 1646
(03	:44:29-03:45:29)	(03	E:47:54-03:48:48)
(03 1	244:29-03:45:29) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly	(03 1	Page 1646 Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
	:44:29-03:45:29)	`	3:47:54-03:48:48)
1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly	1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
1 2	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Remember when you said no? A I said no.	1 2	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct.
1 2 3	 A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated 	1 2 3	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct.
1 2 3 4	 A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated to Bank of New York Mellon lawyers we look forward to our 	1 2 3 4	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct. Q And you copied Mr. Ingber, correct? A Correct.
1 2 3 4 5 6	 A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated to Bank of New York Mellon lawyers we look forward to our discussion and working with you on this transaction. 	1 2 3 4 5 6	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct. Q And you copied Mr. Ingber, correct? A Correct. Q And referred to that group as team, right, hello
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	 ^(44:29-03:45:29) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Remember when you said no? A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated to Bank of New York Mellon lawyers we look forward to our discussion and working with you on this transaction. Those are your words, correct? 	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct. Q And you copied Mr. Ingber, correct? A Correct. Q And referred to that group as team, right, hello team?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 ^{:44:29-03:45:29)} Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Remember when you said no? A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated to Bank of New York Mellon lawyers we look forward to our discussion and working with you on this transaction. Those are your words, correct? A I do. Or they are. 	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct. Q And you copied Mr. Ingber, correct? A Correct. Q And referred to that group as team, right, hello team? A Correct.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 ^{:44:29-03:45:29)} Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Remember when you said no? A I said no. Q Let's look at the 12th paragraph. You indicated to Bank of New York Mellon lawyers we look forward to our discussion and working with you on this transaction. Those are your words, correct? A I do. Or they are. Q PS, next page. I think we all agree that speed 	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Golin from Wachtel, correct? A Correct. Q And you copied Mr. Ingber, correct? A Correct. Q And referred to that group as team, right, hello team? A Correct. Q That's a pretty friendly reference to a group of
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From:	Kravitt, Jason H. P.
Sent:	Saturday, November 20, 2010 11:19 AM
То:	'christopher.garvey@bankofamerica.com'; 'mgkoplow@wlrk.com'; 'jana.j.litsey@bankofamerica.com'; 'tnmirvis@wlrk.com'
Cc:	'kevin.mccarthy@bnymellon.com'; Ingber, Matthew D. <mingber@mayerbrown.com></mingber@mayerbrown.com>
Subject:	Discussions on PSAs etc.

Good morning. I am sure that you will agree that our meeting on Thursday afternoon was a good start on reaching constructive solutions.

I managed to reach Kathy on Friday and had a good follow up conversation with her. We also, as Meyer had suggested, tried calling Ted to have a similar discussion, but weren't able to connect.

Matt and I wished to discuss the following. I suggest that we try to have a similar discussion on Monday or thereabouts so that we can stay coordinated and move as fast as we can as December 17 is really right around the corner.

First, Kathy asked if we would draft the "tolling" agreement. We had some ideas for that ourselves, so we gladly agreed and are drafting such an agreement for the parties' review. We hope that you are okay with that and we also hope to have it for the parties' review early next week.

Second, we discussed with Kathy the probate "solution". We are concerned that the DB case involved reforming a trust where there had clearly been a mistake to conform to the parties' intent. Here, while the argument might be that we are refining the parties' intent on something like what "materially adverse" means, the analogy may not be completely perfect and we all need to think more about the vulnerabilities of a judgment obtained in that fashion.

We also discussed the prepackaged class action where I believe that the argument would revolve around the proper exercise of the Master Servicer's duties with regard to putbacks and the Trustee's effectuation of related remedies. If we could construct a very large, responsible, and varied investor group and gave effective notice to all CHs with opportunity to object, we might very well construct a more "bullet proof" remedy. This idea will take a lot of thought and research of course, but to us at this point in time it seems more appealing.

Another topic for discussion is to what universe of transactions you'd like the settlement to apply? When I asked Kathy what she thought, she wasn't certain either. All CW platforms? All platforms where BofA is MS? All BofA as issuer/seller platforms? First liens or also Helocs? We'd be very interested in your thoughts on that topic as obviously that will inform the architecture of our plans.


Moving on, the Trustee will need to be covered of course to insure that it is not exposed to any potential liability (of course we understand that there is always a risk of lawsuit in these things; but we will need to have expenses and liability covered with an appropriate indemnity from the parties).

(And this doesn't even include a further discussion of how statistical sampling would work, how the "matrix" would be agreed upon, and how dollar damages would be calculated, though, I also like the idea of an agreement on a dollar amount or how to calculate it, with the bank's just paying it and being done.)

Ted had asked us how we felt about various alternative means of payment to CHs. On some (but not nearly enough yet) reflection, we think that the "default" remedy is for funds to go through the waterfall if at all possible (perhaps after deduction for expenses where appropriate), but we are completely open minded at this point.

Judging from our discussion, you have obviously thought long and hard about these kinds of issues. We welcome a discussion as quickly as possible so that we can focus our own follow up efficiently.

We look forward to our discussion and working with you on this transaction.



PS. I think that we all agree that speed (and PR and disclosure coordination) is essential, and we are prepared to work as fast and in as coordinated a fashion as we can.

Jason

Jason H.P. Kravitt Mayer Brown LLP 1675 Broadway New York, N.Y. 10019 Phone: 212 506 2622 Fax: 212 262 1910 Blackberry: 312 493 8865

· 1	Page 4589		Page 4590
-	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly	1	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly
2	what I just said.	2	A Well, the PSAs set forth how money is to flow to
3	Q In the summer of 2010, Bank of New York Mellon knew	3	different classes of certificate holders and certificate
4	that it could be sued by individual certificate holders for	4	holders should understand that when they bought the
02:56:15 5	any actions it took in resolving or settling resolving or	02:57:48 5	securities.
6	negotiating the claims raised by Ms. Patrick; correct?	6	Q But Bank of New York Mellon knew that different
7	A Certificate holders I'm sorry. I don't quite	7	groups of certificate holders may wish to pursue the put-back
8	follow your question.	8	claims in different ways?
9	Q Do you agree that Bank of New York Mellon could be	9	A Yes.
02:56:45 10	sued could've been sued for actions it took in resolving	02:57:59 10	Q Some might want to be more aggressive than others?
11	the claims raised by Ms. Patrick's letter in the summer of	11	A That's correct.
12	2010?	12	Q Some might want to pursue claims only if they got
13	A Could we have been sued?	13	loan files?
14	Q Correct.	14	A That's correct.
02:56:57 15	A Probably.	02:58:07 15	Q Some might want to pursue claims and not enter a
16	Q Okay. And, in fact, that was a concern of Bank of	16	forbearance agreement that would stop an event of default
17	New York Mellon throughout the process?	17	clock from ticking; correct?
18	A I don't recall that.	18	MR. INGBER: This calls for speculation about
19	Q Bank of New York Mellon knew that different groups	19	what other certificate holders might, in theory, want to
02:57:13 20	of certificate holders could be competing for the same	02:58:23 20	do.
21	dollars within the trusts that Ms. Patrick had put the bank	21	MR. REILLY: It's not speculation.
22	on notice of in the summer of 2010?	22	THE COURT: What?
23	A That's true.	23	MR. REILLY: Not speculation.
24	Q And Bank of New York Mellon knew that there	24	THE COURT: Why is it not speculation?
02:57:30 25	was that it had the potential to create conflicts among	02:58:28 25	MR. REILLY: Because that's what they put in
26	certificate holders; correct?	26	their verified petition.
	Page 4591		Page 4592
1	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly	1	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly
1 2	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly THE COURT: Well, if you know	1	_
			L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly
2	THE COURT: Well, if you know	2	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly show you the petition after I ask a couple more
2 3	THE COURT: Well, if you know MR. INGBER: I don't think we put in our	2 3	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly show you the petition after I ask a couple more questions.
2 3 4	THE COURT: Well, if you know MR. INGBER: I don't think we put in our verified petition that some certificate holders might	2 3 4	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly show you the petition after I ask a couple more questions. Q Bank of New York Mellon knew that it would be placed
2 3 4 02:58:39 5	THE COURT: Well, if you know MR. INGBER: I don't think we put in our verified petition that some certificate holders might want to pursue claims and not enter into forbearance	2 3 4 02:59:30 5	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly show you the petition after I ask a couple more questions. Q Bank of New York Mellon knew that it would be placed squarely in the middle of conflicts among certificate holders
2 3 4 02:58:39 5 6	THE COURT: Well, if you know MR. INGBER: I don't think we put in our verified petition that some certificate holders might want to pursue claims and not enter into forbearance agreement that would stop an event of default clock. I'm	2 3 4 02:59:30 5	L. Lundberg - By Respondent - Direct/Reilly show you the petition after I ask a couple more questions. Q Bank of New York Mellon knew that it would be placed squarely in the middle of conflicts among certificate holders if they varied how they wanted to pursue put-back claims;
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(4.0	Page 1479	(4.0	Page 1481
(10	:13:12-10:14:27) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly	(10	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
2	Pooling and Servicing Agreements or trust indentures for	2	various things that we were doing in the settlement.
3	various aspects of them.	3	Q So is it your testimony that you, on behalf of
4	Q And when was that done?	4	Bank of New York Mellon and, therefore, Bank of New York
5	A It was done not all at once. It started I	5	Mellon knew what differences were in the 530 trusts during
6	don't remember when it started, it continued throughout the	6	the settlement negotiations?
7	seven month period.	7	A We believe that we did.
8	Q Was it completed by New Year's Eve 2010?	8	Q And we for that purpose, let me expand that to
9	A No, because different issues kept arising and we	9	make sure you're clear, I'm talking about now the Trustee.
10	would go back and check the agreements on the portions of	10	Based upon what you knew did the Trustee know what the
11	them that applied to the different issues that kept arising.	11	differences were in the 530 trusts during the settlement
12	Q You found through that process that there were	12	negotiations?
13	different provisions in the 530 Pooling and Servicing	13	Ă To the best of my knowledge, we conveyed to the
14	Agreements, correct?	14	Trustee any of the imports of the provisions that affected
15	A Yes.	15	the issues, which the settlement agreement required us to
16	Q And that process was undertaken in part because	16	look at. And we made sure, to the best of our ability, that
17	Bank of New York Mellon was a Trustee 530 different times,	17	our knowledge was passed on to our client, the Trustee.
18	correct?	18	Q Did you ever discuss with any representative of
19	A Correct.	19	Bank of America the difference any differences in
20	Q In 530 different trusts?	20	provisions in the 530 separate trusts?
21	A Correct.	21	A I don't recall.
22	Q And the obligations of the Trustee in each one of	22	Q Did you ever discuss with Ms. Patrick or any other
23	those trusts was driven in part by whatever the language was	23	representative of her group of clients the differences in
24	of the respective Pooling and Servicing agreement?	24	the 530 trusts that you were aware of before June 29th,
25	A Correct.	25	2010 2011?
26	Q And the rights of certificate holders in each one	26	A I almost certainly did, but I can't remember a
	Page 1480		Page 1482
	Page 1480 :14:42-10:16:08)	`):18:10-10:19:08)
1	:14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly	1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly
1 2	:14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the	1 2	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly specific conversation at this point.
1 2 3	:14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the language of that particular Pooling and Servicing Agreement?	1 2 3	 Statistic - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly Specific conversation at this point. Q When you say you almost certainly did, do you mean
1 2 3 4	:14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the language of that particular Pooling and Servicing Agreement? A Correct.	1 2 3 4	 18:10-10:19:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly specific conversation at this point. Q When you say you almost certainly did, do you mean you almost certainly did have that conversation with Kathy
1 2 3	:14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the language of that particular Pooling and Servicing Agreement? A Correct. Q And you found that there were differences in	1 2 3 4 5	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly specific conversation at this point. Q When you say you almost certainly did, do you mean you almost certainly did have that conversation with Kathy Patrick?
1 2 3 4 5 6	 :14:42-10:16:08) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly of those 530 trusts would have been driven in part by the language of that particular Pooling and Servicing Agreement? A Correct. Q And you found that there were differences in provisions within the 530 trusts that mattered as it related 	1 2 3 4 5 6	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Reilly specific conversation at this point. Q When you say you almost certainly did, do you mean you almost certainly did have that conversation with Kathy Patrick? A Well, we discussed the various issues that arose
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1	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly	1	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly
2	Q Well, I'm talking about the beginning of the process	2	Q Do you recall a conversation where anyone with regard
3	and I assumed you were, too. So I'm focusing on this meeting	3	to the event of default ever raised a question and this
			includes Mr. Kravitt "You know, we can't do that because
4	that you had following Mr. Kravitt's first visit with	4	,
5	Ms. Patrick?	5	it's not allowed under the Pooling and Servicing Agreements"?
6	A I don't think there was a meeting. There may have	6	A What is the "that"?
7	been a meeting. I don't recall the construct for how I learned	7	Q Anything. Did anybody ever put up a hand and say,
8	this information.	8	"You know what? If we're going to do that, we're going to have
9	Q Okay. Tell me what else you recall you learned after	9	to figure out how to do it because it's not set forth in the
10	Mr. Kravitt right after Mr. Kravitt met with Ms. Patrick.	10	Pooling and Servicing Agreements"?
11	Have you told me now everything you recall?	11	A Again, I'm not sure I completely understand your
12	A The meeting went well, appeared to be a basis for	12	question.
13	moving forward with potential settlement discussions. And	13	Q Well, then don't answer it. I want to ask you so you
14	Mr. Kravitt may have said that we had to, you know, reach out	14	understand the question.
15	or discuss with Countrywide about the ability of possibly	15	Was there ever a discussion that any action the
16	moving forward.	16	Trustee was taking during the settlement process was not
17	Q Did he talk about having a plan of investigation so	17	specifically authorized by the Pooling and Servicing
18	that the settlement discussions could begin?	18	Agreements?
19	A I'm sorry. I don't understand the question.	19	A There were discussions about the Trustee's authority
20	Q Did he talk about whether there was going to be an	20	to do various things. I don't recall if part of that
21	investigation?	21	discussion may have been "but the trustee can't do X." There
22	A Of loan files?	22	was a discussion of the Trustee's authority, yes.
23	Q Yes.	23	Q That's just a general statement. You don't have the
24	A I don't recall.	24	specific memory of anybody ever saying, "Don't do that. That
25	Q Did he tell you anything about whether or not the plan	25	was not allowed by the Pooling and Servicing Agreements"?
26	was to proceed following the PSAs?	26	A Sitting here today, I do not have that recollection.
	Page 2308		Page 2310
1	-	1	-
1	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly	1	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly
2	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/ReillyA Again, not sure I understand the question, but the	2	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly Q Did Mr. Kravitt tell you that Ms. Patrick was willing
2 3	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly A Again, not sure I understand the question, but the Trustee would follow the PSAs.	2 3	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly Q Did Mr. Kravitt tell you that Ms. Patrick was willing to stop the clock from ticking following that first call, that
2 3 4	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly A Again, not sure I understand the question, but the Trustee would follow the PSAs. Q And Ms. Patrick had agreed to do that, too?	2 3 4	R. Bailey - by Petitioners - Cross/Reilly Q Did Mr. Kravitt tell you that Ms. Patrick was willing to stop the clock from ticking following that first call, that first meeting with her?
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(02	16:42-02:17:34)	(02	2:18:57-02:20:17)
1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Loeser	1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Loeser
2	AFTERNOON SESSION	2	Q And the PSAs cannot be amended without following the
3	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Loeser.	3	procedures in the PSAs for amendments; is that fair?
4	MR. LOESER: How is your car, Your Honor?	4	A That's fair.
5	THE COURT: It could be better, it could be	5	Q And you would agree that the settlement cannot amend
	worse. Thanks.	6	the PSAs; is that fair?
6			
7	BY MR. LOESER:	7	A The settlement could have amended the PSAs because
8	Q Mr. Kravitt, each of the 530 Trusts has a	8	Section 10.01 has, I believe, five circumstances in which you
9	corresponding Governing Agreement; is that correct?	9	don't need certificate holder consent or a rating agency
10	A Correct.	10	consent to modify the PSAs.
11	Q And for most of the trusts, the governing of the	11	Q Okay. So, what you're telling the Court is that there
12	governing document is what we're calling the Pooling and	12	are circumstances where you can change the meanings of the
13	Servicing Agreement; is that correct?	13	provisions of the PSAs?
14	A Correct.	14	A What I'm saying is
	_		
15	Q Mr. Kravitt, could you move the mic a little closer?	15	Q Could you answer that question, sir?
16	A Sorry.	16	A Which question?
17	Q And the PSA set forth the duties and obligations of	17	MR. GONZALEZ: I think he was, Your Honor.
18	the parties to the PSAs; is that correct?	18	A Which question am I supposed to answer?
19	A Correct.	19	MR. LOESER: If we could read the question back,
20	Q And that includes the trustees; is that correct?	20	Your Honor.
21	A Correct.	21	(The record is read by the reporter.)
22	Q And the Master Servicer?	22	A The Section 10.01 in most PSAs provides some
23	A Correct.	23	circumstances in which the parties that you mentioned can amend
	Q And the seller of the loans?		the PSA without certificate holder or rating agency consent.
24		24	
25	_	25	If you interpret that to mean the meaning of the provisions,
26	Q And none of those parties get to just pick and choose	26	then, the answer is yes.
		-	
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	17:43-02:18:44)	`	2:20:29-02:21:51)
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		Page 2154			Page 2155
	1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioners - Redirect/Gonzalez		1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioners - Redirect/Gonzalez
	2	perspective, there is absolutely zero difference between a		2	125, beginning at line 10. At that site he was asked the
	3	report and testimony. It's out of court by a declarant		3	following occurred:
	4	who's not sitting here right now, so there is no difference		4	"Question: Well, wouldn't it be fair to say that
04:10:31	5	as to those two things.	04:11:51	L 5	Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee, had to negotiate
	б	The reason they didn't ask anything from the		6	with its goal of benefiting the beneficiaries, not
	7	report obviously is because they only cherry pick those		7	forming any benefit for itself."
	8	sections of the deposition that they believe somehow were		8	And there was an objection and then answer.
	9	favorable to their position.		9	"Answer: That is basically wrong. Every trustee
04:10:43	10	MR. REILLY: Professor Langbein testified under	04:12:07	7 10	is always acting for itself when it obeys the law
	11	oath to this. If they don't like what he testified to,		11	because if it disobeys the law and attracts liability,
	12	that's one thing, but the report is clearly hearsay. It		12	it's harming the beneficiaries and harming itself. So
	13	doesn't overcome their problem. It's an out-of-court		13	that there is always self-interest whenever a trustee
	14	statement made by someone that they retained, who they can		14	administers a trust. It's in the nature of the
04:11:00		call and bring.	04:12:30) 15	relationship. There is, if you will, a structural
	16	THE COURT: You were at the depositions, so you		16	overlap of interest."
	17	were there and able to somebody was there at the		17	Do you agree or disagree with Professor Langbein's
	18	deposition, so you were there and able to ask questions and		18	opinion in that testimony?
	19	make objections and things. It is different, I think, from		19	A I agree.
04:11:14		a report.	04:12:47	7 20	(Continued on following page.)
01 11 11	21	MR. GONZALEZ: Your Honor, I won't belabor the		21	
	22	point. The issue is that both of them are out of court.		22	
	23	I'll move to just if they want me to ask about		23	
	24	deposition testimony, I'll move beyond Professor Langbein's		24	
04:11:31		opinion.		25	
	26	Q Let's go to Professor Langbein's deposition at page		26	
		Page 2156			Page 2157
	1	KRAVITT-PETITIONER-REDIRECT (GONZALES)		1	KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (WOLLMUTH)
	2	T13 BY MR. GONZALEZ:		2	KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (WOLLMUTH) MR. LOESER: I am here for a question.
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		Page 2158			Page 2159
· 1	1	KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN)		1	KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN)
2	2	is in the best interest of security holders; isn't that correct?		2	Master Purchaser who is causing losses to the Trust.
3	3	A I did.		3	THE COURT: Don't you, don't you mean the Master
4	4	Q And, that does not however, give the Trustee the power		4	A You mean the seller.
00:05:43 5	5	to rewrite the PSAs, does it?	00:07:09	5	Q Let me withdraw.
6	б	A It does not.		6	A Think how tired I am, if you can't ask a question.
7	7	Q And, in fact, it does not give the Trustee the right to		7	Q Sir, you understood one of the options of the Trustee
8	В	override express provisions of the PSAs governing when they may		8	was to sue the Master Servicer, because the Master Servicer had
9	9	be changed, correct?		9	failed to enforce the repurchase rights; isn't that fair?
00:05:55 10	0	A Correct.	00:07:30	10	A That is something that we could have done, if we
11	1	MR. WOLLMUTH: No further questions, your Honor.		11	thought that was, that there was a rational argument that the
12	2	THE COURT: Ms. Kaswan.		12	Master Servicer should have done more.
13	3	RECROSS EXAMINATION		13	Q And, sir, when you said that the Forebearance Agreement
14	4	BY MS. KASWAN:		14	did not effect the rights of other Certificate Holders to give
00:06:02 15	5	Q Mr. Kravitt, when you said one of the reasons that you	00:07:52	15	notices of events of default, did the Forebearance Agreement
16	б	wanted to avoid an event of default was that the Trustee might		16	effect the right of the Trustee to give a notice under 7.01 of
17	7	need to replace the Master Servicer, in fact, there were a lot		17	an event of default?
18	В	of other remedies that the Trustee could have pursued in the		18	A Not with regard to the Trust. That wasn't a subject of
19	9	case of event of default other than replacing the Master		19	the Forebearance Agreement.
00:06:36 20	0	Servicer, right?	00:08:13	20	Q But, with respect to those that were?
21	1	For example, the Trustee could have sued the Master		21	A I have to go back and look at the Forebearance
22	2	Servicer to enforce repurchase rights?		22	Agreement.
23	3	A I think it's		23	Which exhibit is it?
24	4	MS. PATRICK: Objection. Misstates the Master		24	Q So, is it that you don't recall without looking at the
00:06:50 25	5	Servicer doesn't have repurchase obligations.	00:08:25	25	agreement?
26	б	MS. KASWAN: That the Trust could have sued the		26	A I just feel uncomfortable answering without looking at
	6	MS. KASWAN: That the Trust could have sued the Page 2160		26	A I just feel uncomfortable answering without looking at Page 2161
				26	
26	1	Page 2160 KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN)			Page 2161
1	1	Page 2160 KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN) the agreement.		1	Page 2161 KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN) that they had in connection with that report, you will see, I
26 1 2	1 2 3	Page 2160 KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN)		1 2	Page 2161 KRAVITT-PETITIONER-RECROSS (KASWAN)
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[24]	say whatever it is, PFOJ there is an extremely important		if CHL," which is Countrywide Home Loans, "purchases the
	component of that and it's up on the board as number ten in	[25]	modified mortgage loan from the trust fund immediately
[26]	the list that Mr. Reilly put together. And the PFOJ, I	[26]	following the modification as described below."
	Page 268		Page 270
[1]	Opening Statement - Mr. Rollin	[1]	Opening Statement - Mr. Rollin
[2]	believe it's I, states: The trustee appropriately	[2]	That is what 49 of these contracts for which
[3]	evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the claims being	[3]	everything that happens here must be grounded in say about
[4]	settled. And J says, "The trustee's deliberations	[4]	loan modifications. It's simple. It's clean. It's
[5]	appropriately focused on the strengths and weaknesses of	[5]	uncontroverted. It's what it says. Now, Ms. Patrick in
[6]	the trust's released claims."	[6]	her presentation didn't show you this version of the PSA.
[7]	So when I said that we need to focus on the	[7]	Your Honor, this is the kind of language on which a motion
[8]	release, that's exactly what they are doing in the PFOJ.	[8]	for summary judgment can and should be based. It's
[9]	They want you to look at the release and say they did the	[9]	absolutely clear. Now, there is 401 PSAs that fall into
[10]	investigation, they did the evaluation, and they released	[10]	the next category.
[11]	claims appropriately.	[11]	Now, this language, your Honor, adds a couple of
[12]	The evidence will show that the trustee is not	[12]	other conditions. But what's significant is how it starts.
[13]	entitled to these two findings. The trustee did not	[13]	It says, "The master servicer may agree to modification of
[14]	evaluate the modified loan repurchase liability and it gave	[14]	any mortgage loan." Any mortgage loan, it's not talking
[15]	them away for free.	[15]	about some mortgage loans, other mortgage loans. Any
[16]	Now, as everybody has discussed and as Mr. Reilly	[16]	mortgage loan can be modified and it has three conditions.
[17]	noted, there are 530 trusts in this case. They are these.	[17]	One is it's supposed to be in lieu of refinancing. And
[18]	There is a lot of them. Each of these trusts has its own	[18]	another is, the master servicer purchases the modified
[19]	governing document, normally it's called a pooling and	[19]	mortgage loan from the trust fund as described below.
[20]	servicing agreement. For the indentured trusts it's called	[20]	Now, what you will hear, I guess the
[21]	something different. And these PSAs and nobody will	[21]	institutional investors saying because we haven't heard
[22]	dispute this, you won't hear anyone saying otherwise in	[22]	anything from the trustee, who is actually the party who's
[23]	evidence the PSAs dictate how the trusts are supposed to	[23]	suppose to be reading and interpreting these documents, but
[24]	operate. They tell the trustee what it's supposed to do.	[24]	apparently the institutional investors will say that this
[25]	They tell the master servicer what it's supposed to do.	[25]	provision makes it clear there is no obligation to purchase
[26]	They are not allowed to make it up. They are not allowed	[26]	any more modified loan other than in lieu of refinanced
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[1]

[11]

[17]

Opening Statement - Mr. Rollin

[2] to change it. They've got what it tells them they are

[3] supposed to do. And as Ms. Patrick indicated, "what

[4] happens here has to be grounded in the contract." That's a

[5] guote. And nobody is going to disagree with that, your

[6] Honor. No witness is going to say otherwise. But

[7] significantly, the PSAs are not all the same. And this is

[8] nowhere more apparent than with the repurchase of modified

[9] loan provision. Some of the PSAs require the master

[10] servicer to repurchase modified loans, others do not.

[12] out. You just have to read the PSAs. And I know there is

[13] a lot of them and it might take a while to go through all

[14] 530, but the trustee was supposed to read the PSAs. We

[15] read the PSAs, your Honor. And let me tell you what we

[18] PSAs treat repurchased and modified loans. There are three

[19] categories, your Honor, not one. The first category has

[20] 49, I could draw circles around them, there is 49 PSAs that

[21] fall into the first category. And the first category says

[22] this about repurchasing modified loans. "The master

[23] servicer may agree to a modification of any mortgage loan

[16] found about the loan modification provisions.

Your Honor, it is not challenging to figure this

There are three different ways that these 530

[1]

[2]

[5]

[9]

[15]

[23]

Opening Statement - Mr. Rollin

So we are not talking about something normal

the release, the release is really like a bin. It's Bank

The problem, your Honor, is that claims ended up

Your Honor noted yesterday that this has been

[3] here. It does nothing to talk about a big settlement if we

[4] don't look at what it is that we settled. So if we look at

[6] of America's bin. And claims get swept into this bin. And

[7] if the settlement is approved, the bin gets emptied, gets

[8] dumped out. They are off the hook. And they walk away.

[10] in this bin that weren't valuated. Claims were given away

[12] billions of dollars. It's a simple principle, your Honor.

[13] A fiduciary is supposed to protect trust assets; it's not

[16] going on for a couple of years and you know a lot about

[17] this case and you have heard a lot about this case and

[18] that's absolutely true. But there is some claims that you

[19] haven't heard much about, your Honor, and those are the

[20] claims asserted by my clients in the supplemental objection

[21] that was filed on May 3rd. And they have to do with the

[22] release of claims for the repurchase of modified loans.

Now, in the PFOJ, and I am not going to try and

[14] supposed to give them away for free.

[11] for free, valuable claims, claims potentially worth

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			July 11, 2013
(4.0	Page 1776	(4.0	Page 1778
(12	::37:29-12:38:34) Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross- Mr. Reilly	(12	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross- Mr. Reilly
2	Q So your view was your client's view must have	2	settlement even if it learned of facts that were contrary to
3	been you knew in advance of any settlement negotiations	3	a fair settlement being found?
4	between December and when the settlement was submitted that	4	MR. GONZALEZ: Objection. Asked and
5	Bank of America was going to cover your client's conduct?	5	answered, your Honor.
6	A Right. We were very careful lawyers.	6	THE COURT: Go ahead, just answer it, but I
7	Q And you as careful lawyers knew you didn't have	7	think just wrap it up.
8	that assurance without the additional indemnity being signed	8	MR. REILLY: No. I understand.
9	on December 9th, 2010?	9	A Just as BofA promised to support the agreement and
10	A We were very confident that 805 applied, but as	10	not back out of it the facts contrary to its liability
11	you say, we didn't have the assurance from the indemnitor	11	arose, we agreed not to change the settlement. The facts
12	itself and we got that.	12	contrary to our position arose. It was a two sided, evenly
13	Q We meaning Bank of New York Mellon?	13	balanced further assurances paragraph.
14	A We meaning Bank of New York Mellon and Mayer	14	Q Bank of America doesn't have any fiduciary duties
15	Brown.	15	to Certificate Holders, do they?
16	Q And that was a comfort?	16	A Bank of America
17	A That was a comfort, yes.	17	Q It's a yes or no question, Mr. Kravitt.
18	Q And a benefit?	18	Does Bank of America have fiduciary duties to
19	A And a benefit, as Judge Lenihan says.	19	the Certificate Holders that Bank of New York Mellon did
20	Q I didn't know he was there, but	20	have fiduciary duties to?
21	A He said in a decision that an indemnity helps the	21	A I don't know if they do or they don't arising from
22	Certificate Holders in the case of a Trustee because it	22	other circumstances, but not in the circumstances of the
23	frees the Trustee to not worry about its actions.	23	trust. They had lots of duties under the trust.
24	Q But it might not be in the interest of Certificate	24	Q Fiduciary duties to the Certificate Holders?
25	Holders, as you said the other day, right?	25	A I have not researched that. That's a legal
26	A What I said was sometimes the rights that the	26	question, I don't know the answer. But I'm perfectly
	Page 1777		Page 1779
`	2:38:52-12:39:46)		:41:13-12:43:07)
1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross- Mr. Reilly	1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner
2	Trustee has may not necessarily be consistent with what's	0	
3	boot for the Cartificate Holders, but it has these rights	2	willing to tell you that the Trustee has the duty of
1	best for the Certificate Holders, but it has those rights.	3	loyalty.
4	Q And the same is true with regard to after the	3 4	loyalty. Q And it did when it signed the best efforts clause?
5	Q And the same is true with regard to after the settlement agreement. You said that Bank of America gave to	3	loyalty. Q And it did when it signed the best efforts clause? A And it did and it does now.
5 6	Q And the same is true with regard to after the settlement agreement. You said that Bank of America gave to Bank of New York Mellon an indemnity for its conduct in	3 4 5 6	loyalty. Q And it did when it signed the best efforts clause? A And it did and it does now. Q Thank you.
5 6 7	Q And the same is true with regard to after the settlement agreement. You said that Bank of America gave to Bank of New York Mellon an indemnity for its conduct in trying to promote the approval of the settlement, correct?	3 4 5 6 7	loyalty. Q And it did when it signed the best efforts clause? A And it did and it does now. Q Thank you. MR. REILLY: Your Honor, I'll turn it over to
5 6 7 8	Q And the same is true with regard to after the settlement agreement. You said that Bank of America gave to Bank of New York Mellon an indemnity for its conduct in trying to promote the approval of the settlement, correct? A Correct.	3 4 5 6 7 8	loyalty. Q And it did when it signed the best efforts clause? A And it did and it does now. Q Thank you. MR. REILLY: Your Honor, I'll turn it over to Mr. Pozner.
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(4.4	Page 1354	(4.4	Page 1356
1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Direct/Mr. Gonzalez	1	:21:10-11:22:30) J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Direct/Mr. Gonzalez
2	servicing obligations, etc., that provides a lot of risk in the	2	were talking about something on the order of 65 trusts.
3	following way:	3	Q And before that number got to the 530 that are
	First of all, Bank of America is taking a big risk if		
4		4	other figure?
5	it enters into that remedy, but at the same time, other	5	
6	certificate holders are not bound by that remedy and could sue it for additional consideration. The trustee in antering into	6	A Yes. Even while the trust being considered for
7	it for additional consideration. The trustee, in entering into	7	settlement remained just the trust that Kathy could give
8	such a settlement, also exposes exposed itself to liability,	8	binding instructions with regard to, other investors started to
9	because no matter what action a trustee takes, there is usually	9	join her group. And as investors joined her group and their
10	some group of certificate holders who don't agree with it and	10	holdings were combined with the holdings of investors already
11	often sue the trustee or attempt to get the whatever the	11	in the group, the number of trusts as to which she could give
12	trustee did reversed.	12	binding instructions grew and it grew to over 100 and then I
13	And from the investors point of view, they wanted to	13	think it grew eventually to over 200.
14	make sure that whatever they obtained in the settlement could	14	Q And what was your understanding of how it is that that
15	not be taken away from them. So all three parties wanted to	15	investor group expanded?
16	make sure that the settlement's terms would be binding and	16	A Well, my understanding is that in many cases they
17	final, and in the case of Bank of America, insulated from any	17	heard about what Ms. Patrick was doing and approached her to
18	further remedies, and in the case of Bank of New York, make	18	ask to become part of the group.
19	sure that it would not be liable or for him to go out-of-pocket	19	Q Now, turning back to your e-mail, Mr. Kravitt, in the
20	solely because it entered into, negotiated and performed a	20	next paragraph where it's beginning "Moving on," you write
21	settlement agreement.	21	A Yes, let's everybody move on.
22	Q Now, in the next paragraph you use the term "universe	22	Q We are well beyond that, at this point.
23	transaction."	23	"Moving on, the trustee will need to be covered, of
24	What is that a reference to?	24	course," and then you go on.
25	A Well, from the very first meeting, that is, the	25	What are you referring to there that "the trustee will
26	November 18th meeting, the parties discussed what the	26	need to be covered"?
(11	19:23-11:20:55)	(11	:22:54-11:24:19) Page 1357
(11 1	19:23-11:20:55)	(11 1	:22:54-11:24:19)
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Fischel-Petitioners-Direct/Mr. Ingber	1 Fischel-Petitioners-Direct/Mr. Ingber
supports the reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement	2 be, was very uncertain and is very uncertain.
as well as the Trustee's decision to enter into the	3 And I think it's useful to just imagine what
settlement.	4 would have happened had the Trustee rejected the
Obviously, in this particular case, the	5 \$8.5 billion settlement with the servicing remedy, with the
Trustee went further and engaged in the process of hiring	6 document remedy and as a result, the parties got bogged down
additional experts; but in my opinion, even if the Trustee	7 and what might have happened if that occurred, such as for
had not done that, even if the Trustee had relied solely on	8 example, Countrywide going bankrupt and of the 530 trusts
the support of the Institutional Investors in light of the	9 instead of getting the \$8.5 billion and the related remedies
facts and circumstances of this case that I described, that	10 got virtually nothing or were creditors in bankruptcy
would be sufficient.	11 proceeding.
In fact, the Trustee being criticized for	12 And I think if you start to think of the
going beyond for what I believe what was necessary to	13 alternatives of what could have happened in light of the
support the reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement is	14 uncertainty about collection as well as the magnitude of the
really more an example of no good deed goes unpunished, and	15 claim, I think the Trustee's decision looks, at least to me,
a justifiable basis for criticizing the behavior of the	16 very good.
Trustee.	17 The third basis for my opinion is that all of
My second basis for my opinion that the is	18 the claims in this case, about the conflicts of the Trustee,
that as stated in the on the screen, the proposed	19 are fundamentally flawed. I've looked at all of them. I
settlement is reasonable and adequate in light of the	20 don't believe the Trustee had any conflicts. I believe from
uncertainty about the value of the claim and the ability to	21 what I can tell, the Trustee acted ethically and honorably
recover in litigation, as well as the delay that litigation	and in the best interest of the trust and the certificate
would cause.	23 holders at all points in time.
And, basically, what that opinion is, I think	And, finally, I looked at the consensus
both the magnitude of the claim as well as the ability to	25 market's reaction to the announcement of the settlement;
collect on whatever ultimately the claim was demonstrated to	26 because one way to test whether Bank of America got

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1	Fischel-Petitioners-Direct/Mr. Ingber
2	basically a windfall in this settlement, settlement for much
3	less than what the settlement should be, is to look at how
4	market participants, contemporaneous market participants who
5	observed the settlement, observed the events leading up to
6	the settlement, what their consensus judgment was.
7	Again, it doesn't prove that the settlement
8	was reasonable and adequate, but it gives some indication of
9	what people in the marketplace, including the most
10	sophisticated investors in the world thought about the
11	reasonableness of the settlement.
12	And based on my analysis, I've concluded that
13	the market judgment of the settlement is completely
14	consistent with my basic opinion that the proposed
15	settlement was reasonable and adequate.
16	Q Thank you, Professor.
17	Now, before we get into the details of your
18	opinions, would it be helpful for you to have a copy of your
19	reports?
20	A Sure.
21	Q That we would talk about and you could refer to them?
22	A Sure.
23	MR. INGBER: Your Honor, may I hand these reports
24	to Professor Fischel?
25	THE COURT: Sure.
26	(Handed)

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1	Fischel-Petitioners-Direct/Mr. Ingber
2	A Thank you.
3	Q Okay, Professor, let's focus on the first basis for
4	your opinion that the proposed settlement was reasonable and
5	adequate and that is the behavior of the Institutional
б	Investors.
7	Can you explain this opinion to the Court?
8	A Yes. Basically, what I said before that I believe
9	under the facts and circumstances of this case, the behavior
10	of the Institutional Investors in light of their large
11	economic stake, the absence of any conflict that they had
12	with other certificate holders, the role of the Trustee, it
13	being able to facilitate negotiations and observe that the
14	negotiations were at arm's length, as well as in combination
15	with other opinions that I mentioned, as I said by itself if
16	there were nothing else would be sufficient for me to
17	justify the reasonableness and adequacy of the settlement,
18	as well as the Trustee deciding to enter into the
19	settlement.
20	Remember, that even though the Trustee has
21	obligations to the trust and the certificate holders, the
22	parties who are either paying the money or receiving the
23	money are not do not include the Trustee. They are the
24	certificate holders on the one hand represented by and the
25	Institutional Investors represented by counsel and the Bank
26	of America.

		Page 3499			Page 3500
	1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber		1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber
	2	paragraph, even within the covered trust, "the inside		2	A Okay. First of all, as I think it's clear just from
	3	investors" and I just want to emphasize, "are not		3	the language, there's a complete disconnect between the
	4	representative of other certificate holders in the following		4	statement of what's going to be shown and the supposed
11:32:58	5	ways." So before going through the reasons, this is a claim	11:34:40	5	evidence. The evidence in this first bullet point doesn't
	6	that the institutional investors, in contrast with what I		6	demonstrate anything. It's just pure speculation about the
	7	said, are not representative of the other certificate		7	relationship between the collateral makeup of the 189 trusts
	8	holders, and he lists a series of reasons. And what I want		8	versus the other trusts, it doesn't establish anything about
	9	to do is go through those reasons and see what the support is		9	whether or not representative.
11:33:23	10	in the reasons for the bold claim that is made at the outset	11:35:00	10	But if you go further than that, and the reason
	11	that the institutional investors are not representative.		11	you go further than that is that this is something that's
	12	So let's look at first, "the particular 189		12	easy to verify. You can look at the interrogatory
	13	covered trusts in which the inside investors have 25		13	responses, the CUSIP numbers in connection with
	14	percent of the voting rights may have." First of all		14	particular trusts, go to well-recognized widely-used
11:33:48	15	underline "may have", "a different collateral makeup than	11:35:22	15	databases, ABS Net, and actually look at the relationship
	16	the other 341 covered trusts. To wit, the trusts in		16	between the collateral makeup of the 189 trusts versus
	17	which the inside investors have 25 percent of the voting		17	the other trusts. And if you did that, which anybody can
	18	rights, may have" and again underline "may have"		18	do based on the information that was provided to them,
	19	again, "more subprime or Alt-A collateral or vice versa,"		19	you would see that there's not much difference at all.
11:34:11	20	under line "vice versa." So this is supposedly a basis	11:35:46	20	So it's not just speculation that proves nothing, it's
	21	for why the inside institutional investors are not		21	speculation that's wrong and speculation that can be
	22	representative		22	easily demonstrated to be wrong by looking at obvious
	23	Q Okay. Professor, let me interrupt for a second.		23	sources that anybody who is familiar with the data in
	24	I'd like you to respond to this first bullet		24	this field would be able to analyze.
11:34:25	25	point, and before you move onto the second, I think we	11:36:07	25	MR. INGBER: Okay. Thank you.
	26	are going to have a short morning break.		26	On that note, I think, your Honor, we'll
		Page 3501			Page 3502
	1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber		1	Page 3502 Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber
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11:54:47 11:55:06 11:55:24	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber THE COURT: Yeah. We're going to take a ten-minute break. And you can step down and then we'll continue. THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. (Recess taken.) THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ingber, you may continue. MR. INGBER: Thank you, your Honor. Q Professor Fischel, right before the break, you were taking us through Professor Levitin's analysis of the role of the institutional investors and you had given your reaction your response to Bullet #1. Can you proceed to bullet point #2 please? A Yes. And maybe I'll be a little briefer with bullet point #2 because it's basically the same point as bullet point #1. But this is supposedly the second basis in Professor Levitin's opinion as to why the institutional investors are not representative. So if you begin just with the first sentence, "the institutional investors may not be", again, the same speculation, "invested in similarly supposed tranches of 	11:56:29 11:56:57 11:57:16	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber holders in the 530 trusts did not, rather than read the whole thing. But if you just go to the last sentence and just highlight that, "if that were the case, their interests would not be representative of many other certificate holders." So, again, he doesn't say that is the case, he just speculates as to what might happen if it were the case. But, again, it turns out that this is something that can be checked and it's not the case. You can look at the CUSIP numbers for the certificate holders of the various trusts that were provided by the institutional investors interrogatories, look at a standard database, ABS Net, and compare the tranches held by the institutional investors with all the other certificate holders in all the different trusts. And so it's not just speculation, again, it's incorrect speculation. Speculation that can be refuted by checking, and certainly provides no support for the basic claim that the institutional investors are not representative of the other certificate holders. If anything, if you did the checking, you would conclude the opposite. But, again, there's a basic reality check which is that there's been ample time to object after the

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· 1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber		1	
2	they were invested in certificates, were different		2	
3	collateral, different tranches, whatever reason, they		3	
4	would object. And, again, the absence of any comparable		4	
11:57:58 5	opposition group in terms of economic stake, I think, is	11:59:37	5	
6	also inconsistent with these particular claims.		6	
7	And just moving to the third point, again, the		7	
8	first sentence, the third, "if the institutional		8	
9	investors accumulated all or part of their positions in		9	
11:58:19 10	the covered trusts at distressed prices, they would have	11:59:53	10	
11	different incentives regarding the proposed settlement		11	
12	from an investor that purchased at par." And here, I		12	
13	would say again that, not only speculation, but there's		13	
14	basically a fundamentally economic error that's embedded		14	
11:58:39 15	in this particular sentence because it's presuming that	12:00:15	15	
16	the prices that the certificate holders pay will dictate		16	
17	how much they're willing to accept. In other words,		17	
18	implicit in this statement is that if a certificate		18	
19	holder purchased at a lower price, they're willing to		19	
11:59:06 20	leave huge amounts of money on the table because they	12:00:36	20	
21	purchased at a low price as opposed to for themselves,		21	
22	for their clients that they have a fiduciary obligation		22	
23	to as opposed to trying to get as much as they can.		23	
24	So, again, it's not just speculation, but it's		24	
11:59:23 25	speculation that's incorrect. In fact, there's a term in	12:00:54	25	
26	economics that describes this kind of error, it's		26	
	Page 3505			
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1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber		1 2	r
	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't			ľ,
2	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber		2	r.
2 3	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight	12:02:43	2 3	"
2 3 4	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent	12:02:43	2 3 4	". 0
2 3 4 12:01:17 5	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional	12:02:43	2 3 4 5	" o a
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call	12:02:43	2 3 4 5 6	" o a v
2 3 4 12:01:17 6 7	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed	12:02:43	2 3 4 5 6 7	u a v a
2 3 4 12:01:17 6 7 8	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement.	12:02:43	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	u a v a r
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 7 8 9	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	u a v a r
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	u a v a r y
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case?		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	n v t
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2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11 12 12 13	 Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case? A Well, particularly, having heard the testimony this morning and basically what I'm familiar with from my own 		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	u a v a r v y tt t t t
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2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11 12 13 14 12:15 15 16 17 18 19 12:02:16 20	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case? A Well, particularly, having heard the testimony this morning and basically what I'm familiar with from my own background, my understanding is anybody could object. There is no ownership no minimum ownership requirement, no filing fee, no hundred-page form to fill out or anything else that would and plus there's enough money at stake that if there was any serious issue about whether the institutional investors, their role was adequate in being, in effect, a proxy for all the certificate holders, that you would expect	12:03:03	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	o a v v a r r y y t t e e t is is is is t f f e e
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11 12 13 14 12:01:50 15 16 17 18 19 12:02:16 20 21	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case? A Well, particularly, having heard the testimony this morning and basically what I'm familiar with from my own background, my understanding is anybody could object. There is no ownership no minimum ownership requirement, no filing fee, no hundred-page form to fill out or anything else that would and plus there's enough money at stake that if there was any serious issue about whether the institutional investors, their role was adequate in being, in effect, a proxy for all the certificate holders, that you would expect that there were a serious issue, there would be a lot more	12:03:03	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	v a v v a r v y t t t e e p p is is is t t t f d e n n
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 21 22 23 24	 Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case? A Well, particularly, having heard the testimony this morning and basically what I'm familiar with from my own background, my understanding is anybody could object. There is no ownership no minimum ownership requirement, no filing fee, no hundred-page form to fill out or anything else that would and plus there's enough money at stake that if there was any serious issue about whether the institutional investors, their role was adequate in being, in effect, a proxy for all the certificate holders, that you would expect that there were a serious issue, there would be a lot more objections. MR. INGBER: PTX 621. (Exhibit displayed.) 	12:03:03	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	v a v a r r y d d e p p is is is o o d d f f f e e n a
2 3 4 12:01:17 5 6 7 8 9 12:01:33 10 11 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 13 14 12 12 21 22 23	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber could be gotten in a settlement. And then you wouldn't have had this disparity between 25 percent versus eight percent that currently exists, you'd have 25 percent versus 50 percent, or something that would really call into question how representative the institutional investors were in negotiating what led up to the proposed settlement. Q And what's your understanding of how costly it would've been for a certificate holder to object in this case? A Well, particularly, having heard the testimony this morning and basically what I'm familiar with from my own background, my understanding is anybody could object. There is no ownership no minimum ownership requirement, no filing fee, no hundred-page form to fill out or anything else that would and plus there's enough money at stake that if fiver was any serious issue about whether the institutional investors, their role was adequate in being, in effect, a proxy for all the certificate holders, that you would expect that there were a serious issue, there would be a lot more objections. MR. INGBER: PTX 621.	12:03:03	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	a v v y tt e e p p p p f i i i i i i i i i i i i i f f f f

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four bases for your opinion that the settlement was

referred to as a sunk cost fallacy --THE COURT: Would you like to spell that or would you mind spelling that? THE WITNESS: Yeah. It actually may be simpler --THE COURT: I say it for her, but for me too. THE WITNESS: It's S-U-N-K, sunk, second word cost, C-O-S-T, fallacy. And what the term implies is exactly the way it sounds. Is that what you did in the past is sunk, it's over, it's gone, and it's not going to influence trying to do as well as you can going forward. But, again, but it's not just an abstract principle of economics, there is a similar reality check here. If there were other certificate holders -- if this claim were correct, if this pure speculation were correct, if there are other certificate holders who purchased at high prices and had greater losses, assuming the speculation is correct, and felt that the institutional investors were selling them out because they purchased at lower prices, there's an obvious solution; they could've registered their objections to the Court and stated that they don't believe that the institutional investors were adequately representing

Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber

their interests because of the difference in the purchase prices as opposed to what the reasonable amount that

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	1	Professor D. Fischel - By Petitioner - Direct/Ingber
	2	reasonable and adequate, and let's focus on #2 here, that
	3	"the proposed settlement is reasonable and adequate in light
	4	of the uncertainty about the value of the claim and the
2:43	5	ability to recover in litigation and also the delay that
	6	would accompany litigation." And I'd like to start by asking
	7	a few questions about what you referred to in your expert
	8	report as the economics of this settlement decision. Could
	9	you explain that term to Justice Kapnick?
8:03	10	A Yes. Certainly. It's the basic decision process
	11	that a party, in this case the trustee, has to go through,
	12	either explicitly or implicitly, when confronted with the
	13	possibility of settling a claim. There's always the
	14	possibility that the perception is that the settlement offer
3:31	15	is too low and you could do better by going further in the
	16	litigation process and that happens all the time. Settlement
	17	offers are rejected and the parties go forward in the hope
	18	that they can do better. But on the other hand, going
	19	forward is not costless. There's not just the time and the
8:58	20	expense of further litigation, but, more importantly, there's
	21	no guarantee that going further in the litigation guarantees
	22	a better outcome. Sometimes, the bird in the hand is the
	23	best deal you can get. And if you go further, you not only
	24	waste time, waste money, but the outcome is worse as a
1:23	25	result.
	26	So the tradeoff for a party faced with a

	Page 3124		Page 3125
· 1	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber	1	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber
2	THE COURT: I can handle that.	2	particular issue, the obligor there being Countrywide, was
3	(Handing to the Court.)	3	capable of paying. So right there, certainty of payment is one
4	THE COURT: All right. You may continue.	4	of the key aspects. The probability that being made as well,
10:27:26 5	MR. INGBER: Okay.	10:29:10 5	well, Bank of America was agreeing to it in terms of the
6	BY MR. INGBER:	6	Settlement Agreement.
7	Q Mr. Stanley, what was your rationale for voting in	7	As they discussed it, I'm sitting there saying,
8	favor of the Trustee entering into the Settlement Agreement?	8	okay, what's the best next alternative to that particular
9	A The way I thought, and it's based on my lending	9	payment. And the next best alternative, as I understood it, was
10:27:41 10	background and the IR background, to be honest with you, it was	10:29:23 10	going down a very challenging road. And the way I thought about
11	the certainty of the payment and the probability that it would	11	it was a loan-by-loan type of a road in terms of arguing each
12	get paid and aspects around that as the core issue in my mind.	12	loan and whether there was a breach to that loan and whether or
13	So, as it was being presented to me by Bob, as	13	not we can have Bank of America on the hook to make those type
14	well as by Loretta, the type of thoughts that were going through	14	of payments. So, in my mind, that was very, very ugly in terms
10:28:07 15	my mind is, if I'm sitting in the investor role, how am I going	10:29:44 15	of certainty of the payment and the probability of when it was
16	to get to this cash and the speed at which I'm going to get to	16	going to be made.
17	it. So, first thing I was thinking was looking at the size of	17	I take it to the next step, you know, referring to
18	the actual payment itself and who could be obligated to make	18	various experts, I looked at the issue of, if I were to go down
19	that payment. That got into that conversation about, well,	19	that particular more detailed road, were there hurdles
10:28:29 20	Countrywide is one of the key places for the cash, could they	10:30:06 20	THE COURT: Could you just wait a minute?
21	make the payment the size that was eventually reached. And, you	21	MR. INGBER: Sure.
22	know, there was reflection there regarding the one of the	22	(Pause in proceedings.)
23	experts - I forgot the name - created a valuation of Countrywide	23	THE COURT: Sorry. You may continue. Sorry.
24	and the payment was well above what they would be able to pay.	24	A were there hurdles if I were going down the other
10:28:47 25	So, right there a certainty of payment was, Bank of America was	10:30:44 25	route, loan-by-loan, that people would - Bank of America
26	stepping up to make sure that size payment well beyond that	26	specifically - would they be able to put up hurdles allowing us
	Page 3126		Page 3127
1	Page 3126 Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber	1	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber
2	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber to get to those maybe larger payments. And there was a	2	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber And there's some real meat behind the commitment that I think it
2 3	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber to get to those maybe larger payments. And there was a conversation, pointed to some of the legal documentation or the	2 3	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber And there's some real meat behind the commitment that I think it was Bank of America was the master servicer would make in terms
2 3 4	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber to get to those maybe larger payments. And there was a conversation, pointed to some of the legal documentation or the expert documentation that was in the folder that basically said	2 3 4	Stanley - by Petitioner - Direct/Ingber And there's some real meat behind the commitment that I think it was Bank of America was the master servicer would make in terms of an audit report, monthly reports, benchmarking, stuff like
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		Page 3128			Page 3129
	1	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)		1	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)
	2	T3 BY MR. INGBER:		2	that they had to go, and they had legal defenses at a high level
	3	A (Continuing) Third big point, this was a compromise.		3	to avoid if we went down a different route and the probability
	4	It was a compromise between parties that are having a real		4	of payment was extremely high, subject to Court approval, and
10:32:57	5	challenging time up front getting together, where I am heading	10:34:23	5	allowed other Investors' voices at the table throughout the
	6	there.		б	process.
	7	You are dealing with 22 of some the most sophisticated		7	When you add all of that together, the reasonableness
	8	investors in the world and they approved it. So, you know, in		8	of the decision, I thought, was very high.
	9	my mind, that's, it's market tested. Here is the investor		9	Q Mr. Stanley, did your rationale for voting to approve
10:33:11		telling me, I want the deal.	10:34:45 1	.0	the settlement have anything to do with an interest in having
	11	So, I have a market test with some of the most	1		the Trustee avoid any liability?
	12	sophisticated investors in the world. I have got more money on	1		A No. As a matter of fact, we were preparing back up
	13	the table that some of obligors that I understood could even	1		service in-lines in case whatever happened, you know, if other
	14	pay. I had a certainty of payment, and then you get to the	1		scenarios might occur, to make sure we were prepared for other
10:33:29		point where, about the other investors that are not at the table	10:35:07 1		scenarios.
10.33.23	16	because there are lot more investors in these Trusts than 22,	10133107 1		Q Was your decision to vote in favor of approving the
	17	whatever the number was.	1		settlement motivated at all by a desire to avoid an event of
	18	That's where the Court approval was discussed and	1		default?
	19	again, this is my rationale, this was a forum for other	1		MS. KASWAN: Your Honor, leading.
10:33:45		investors to have a voice. So, it opened it up to the public,	10:35:29 2		THE COURT: Can you rephrase your question please?
10.33.43	20	if you will, all the investors, to have a voice at the table.		21	MR. INGBER: What was the objection?
	21	So, I am sitting here saying okay, it's market tested		2	MS. KASWAN: Leading.
	23	by investors that have skin in the game, real skin, I know there		23	THE COURT: Leading.
	24	was a challenge in getting to that compromise, just given the		24	MR. LOESER: Is his answer based on the advice of
10:34:04		length of time it's taken to get, the months it took, I have got	10:35:50 2		counsel or his answer
10.34.04	26	an obligor, Bank of America, going beyond where I understood		26	THE COURT: I am letting you rephrase the question.
	20	an oblight, bank of 7 merca, going beyond where 1 understood	-		THE COORT. Tail letting you replicase the question.
		Page 3130			Page 3131
	1	Page 3130 STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)		1	Page 3131 STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)
	1 2			1 2	2
		STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)			STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER)
	2	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER) Q Was the topic of an event of default, a topic of		2	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER) In my actions that I take with Trustees, you do what
10:36:11	2 3	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER) Q Was the topic of an event of default, a topic of discussion at the Trust Committee meeting?		2 3	STANLEY-PETITIONER-DIRECT (INGBER) In my actions that I take with Trustees, you do what you need to do within the four corners of the document, and in
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	Page 1874	Page 1876
	57:57) Krowitt Detitioner Cross/Mr Dezner	(11:59:29-12:00:58)
1	Kravitt - Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner	1 J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner
2	try to correct you, but I apologize. It's not the lower	2 A That is my understanding.
3	down you are in the tranche, it's the lower down the tranche	3 Q And so, what happens now is we get to the proposed
4	is in the hierarchy.	4 waterfall in this case, and what you are proposing is that you
5	(Continued on next page.)	5 will look at the trusts, you will compute the losses in the
6		6 trusts, you will compare that loss in the trust to the overall
7		7 settlement number and divide the number up that way including
8		8 projections of future losses?
9		9 A Correct, you stated it precisely. The formula is each
10		10 trust gets a fraction of the 8.5 billion, the numerator, which
11		11 is for it is the sum of experienced losses plus projected
12		12 losses and the denominator of which is the sum of all trusts
13		13 enumerated.
14		14 Q Now, let's talk about the sophisticated investors who
15		15 purchased into the tranches at deep discounts, and you are
16		16 aware that that happened, are you not?
17		17 A I assume that that has happened with regard to
18		18 Countrywide, but I don't know who bought their tranches when.
19		19 Q You don't know who bought the tranches when, but
20		20 everything in the securitization world is trackable and you
21		21 can't hide that you purchased it?
22		A Well, you can. I'm not trying to create a controversy
23		23 with you, but it's very easy to hide who owns things because
24		24 who owns things goes through so many names. In fact, if you
25		25 look at the number of holders in the trust, it looks like there
26		26 is only 12 holders because it's held in the dealers' names, and
	Page 1875	Page 1877
	Page 1875	Page 1877 (12:01:18-12:02:45)
(11) 1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner	(12:01:18-12:02:45) 1 J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner
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(12	1:03:06-12:04:26)	(12	:06:03-12:07:21)
1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner	1	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner
2	A Well, I disagree. Here is why I disagree. The way we	2	A I don't know it happened. I believe that it probably
3	wrote the Settlement Agreement is that it's the tranches who	3	happened.
4	are most senior who suffered losses who get the cash first,	4	Q That wasn't part of the investigation either, was it?
	-	5	A There is no way to go into the market and figure out
5	therefore, the people who are holding subordinated and most		
6	subordinated tranches, likely, will not get any cash out of the	6	who wrote the securities. The entire United States government
7	settlement if the losses in the settlement went to any of the	7	could try to do that and they wouldn't be able to.
8	senior level tranches. So, if you made a bet on a subordinated	8	Q Well, did you ask Ms. Patrick, Did any of the
9	tranche, this wouldn't necessarily get you any cash distributed	9	companies that are on your Steering Committee who came to be
10	out of the settlement. The way the cash is distributed would	10	your clients, buy into these securitizations at a deep discount
11	restore the face amount of some of this or the face amount	11	from par?
12	or the partial portion of the face amount of any lower	12	A I don't know.
13	seniority tranche, it might get some interest in a future	13	Q Because if she has clients like BlackRock, like PIMCO,
14	period it might not otherwise get.	14	like WAMCO, who are astute investors and bought into these
15	But the recovery goes first in line to the senior	15	securitizations in the upper levels at deep discounts to par,
16	holders and then the next level and so on down to the bottom.	16	when we figure out how much they are going to get in this
17	Q Exactly. You wrote the waterfall yourself, your firm?	17	settlement, it be will be a completely different rate of return
	A No.		
18		18	than the same investor in the same tranche who bought in
19	MS. PATRICK: Objection.	19	initially and paid par. That is mathematical, isn't it?
20	Q Who wrote it for you?	20	MS. PATRICK: Objection to form. Speculation,
21	A There is no	21	lacks foundation and irrelevant.
22	Q Let me maybe I'm asking it wrong. Let me ask it	22	THE COURT: Yes.
23	again.	23	MS. PATRICK: Where people bought, when, is
24	MS. PATRICK: Excuse me. Can the witness finish	24	utterly irrelevant to this issue.
25	his answer?	25	THE COURT: I don't get that that matters.
26	THE COURT: I'm sorry?	26	MR. REILLY: Pardon me?
	Page 1879		Page 1881
(12	Page 1879	(12	:07:29-12:08:35)
(12 1	Page 1879 J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner	(12 1	Page 1881 :07:29-12:08:35) J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner
	::04:30-12:05:44)		:07:29-12:08:35)
1 2	:04:30-12:05:44) J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner MS. PATRICK: Can the witness finish his answer?	1 2	J. Kravitt - by Petitioner - Cross/Mr. Pozner THE COURT: What does it matter?
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